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I. APPELLEE HAS 
MISCONSTRUED THE FOLLOWING FACTS IN THE RECORD 
The Appellee has erroneously misconstrued its statement of 
facts in its Brief and in the Findings of Fact prepared by Appellee 
that were "rubber stamped" by the Court. Following are certain 
obvious and material facts stated by Appellee that are clearly 
erroneous when comparing them to the record: 
1. Section 1 of the proposed lease document (Exhibit 11) requires 
that a "certificate of occupancy" be issued by the appropriate 
governmental authority as a condition precedent to commencement of 
the lease 
Appellee: "CUA had a valid certificate of occupancy for the entire 
building . . . ." (Appellee's brief page 5) (Finding 8). 
Record: "A: UNDER THE BUILDING CODE, SECTION 307, 
THERE'S [A] REQUIREMENT THAT ANY TIME THERE'S A CHANGE OF 
OCCUPANCY, BEFORE THAT SPACE CAN BE USED OR OCCUPIED, A 
NEW CERTIFICATE OF OCCUPANCY MUST BE ISSUED BY THE 
BUILDING OFFICIAL. . . . 
"Q: SO IT WOULD BE PERMISSIBLE TO USE THAT SPACE AND 
BUILD A FACILITY ACCORDING TO THOSE PLANS AND OCCUPY THAT 
SPACE WITHOUT A CERTIFICATE OF I-OCCUPANCY? 
"A: NO, IT WOULD NOT BE LEGAL TO DO SO. " (CARL ERICSON, 
SALT LAKE CITY MANAGER OF INSPECTION SERVICES, R 2105). 
No certification of occupancy had been issued on that space. 
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2. Appellee: "TSL told Mr. Teerlink that there were two levels 
of certification for medical offices, but that CPSS did not want 
the higher level of certification." (Appellee's brief 5) (Finding 
15). 
Appellee: "Not only is [I-certification] not expressed at all in 
the lease, but it was also not mentioned in lease negotiations." 
(Appellee's brief 23) (Finding 12). 
Record: "A: SOMETIME IN THE EARLY CONVERSATIONS THAT I 
HAD WITH DR. LINDLEY, THE WORD CERTIFICATION CAME UP, 
THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO ACHIEVE A HIGHER LEVEL OF 
CERTIFICATION WAS THE REASON THAT I UNDERSTOOD THEY 
WANTED TO MOVE IN THEIR PRESENT FACILITY." (TEERLINK, R 
1286). 
Record: "Q: YOU LEARNED FROM THOSE DOCTORS, DID YOU 
NOT, THAT IT WAS A REQUIREMENT FOR CERTIFICATION TO 
OBTAIN MEDICAID AND MEDICARE, THAT THAT WAS AN IMPORTANT 
FACTOR FOR THEM. IS THAT TRUE OR NOT TRUE? THAT WAS 
BEFORE ANY LEASE WAS EVER SIGNED? 
"A: THE TOPIC OF CERTIFICATION WAS DISCUSSED, YES. 
"Q: AND AS PART OF THAT DISCUSSION THERE WAS CLEAR 
REFERENCE THAT THEY HAD TO MAKE SURE THEY QUALIFIED FOR 
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID INSURANCE BENEFITS; ISN'T THAT 
TRUE? 
"A: DR. LINDLEY TOLD ME THAT HE WANTED TO ACHIEVE A 
LEVEL OF CERTIFICATION AND TO USE HIS TERMS, NOT THE 
HIGHEST LEVEL OF CERTIFICATION BUT ONE THAT WOULD QUALIFY 
FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID. 
"Q: AT LEAST YOU KNEW BEFORE THAT THAT WAS AN IMPORTANT 
REQUIREMENT; IS THAT CORRECT? 
"A: YES, THAT IS CORRECT." (TEERLINK, R 1322 1323). 
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"A: IT WAS THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE CENTER WAS TO CREATE 
A FACILITY BECAUSE THEIR FACILITY THEY WERE WORKING OUT 
OF DID NOT QUALIFY FOR THAT CERTIFICATION. THEY WERE 
LOOKING TO MOVE TO A FACILITY THAT THEY COULD BUILD THAT 
COULD ACHIEVE THAT LEVEL OF CERTIFICATION. . . . 
"A: I AM SURE THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO THEM." 
(TEERLINK, R 1336-1337). 
3. Appellee: "Mr. Bearnson did not know what B-2 or I-occupancy 
certification meant, and these certification levels were never 
discussed in negotiations. Mr. Bearnson never discussed Medicare 
or Medicaid during the lease negotiations process." (Appellee's 
brief 6) (Finding 12). 
Record: "A: FOR THE SPECIFIC OUTPATIENT SURGERY USE. 
THERE IS A STATE CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT, THE EXACT 
DETAILS OF WHICH I REALLY CAN'T TELL YOU. BUT I KNOW 
THAT THE STATE DOES CERTIFY THEM, THAT CERTIFICATION IS 
REQUIRED IF YOU ARE TO PERFORM PROCEDURES IN THERE THAT 
THIRD PARTY PAYORS, INSURANCE COMPANIES, 
MEDICARE/MEDICAID WILL APPROVE PAYMENT FOR. 
"Q: WAS THAT DISCUSSED WITH YOU AND MR. TEERLINK? 
"A: IT WAS SPECIFICALLY, YES." (BRAD BEARNSON—ATTORNEY 
AT LAW, R 1700). 
4. Appellee: "Mr. Teerlink, at the request of CPSS, prepared a 
letter which compared the relative costs of building out a medical 
facility in each building. The costs were based on the buildout 
costs for the U-Care space for comparison purposes." (Appellee's 
brief 6) (Finding 9). 
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Record: "Q: IN YOUR DEPOSITION, YOU CALLED IT BIDS THAT 
YOU GOT FROM TCM, DIDN'T YOU? 
"A: THE WORD "BID" IS IN THERE . . . ." (TEERLINK, R 
1359). 
Record:—Exhibit 2: BID LETTER OF AUGUST 24, 1988, FROM 
TEERLINK TO CPSS--"TOTAL BUILDOUT COSTS = $97.840." 
Record: "A: AS THE BIDS CAME IN, ORIGINALLY IT WAS 
HUNDRED TWELVE DOLLARS [$112] A SQUARE FOOT. ULTIMATELY, 
IT WAS NINETY-NINE [$99] DOLLARS. 
"Q: THAT CAME OUT TO TWO HUNDRED NINETY THOUSANDS 
DOLLARS [$290,000]; ISN'T THAT CORRECT? 
"A: CORRECT. 
"Q: DID YOU KNOW MR. TEERLINK REPRESENTED THAT COULD BE 
DONE FOR NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND [$97,000] DOLLARS? 
"A: I HAD NO SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF THAT." (JOEL MADSEN, 
BUILDER—WITNESS FOR APPELLEE, R 1417). 
5. Appellee: "Mr. Nelson [architect] told CPSS that buildout 
costs would be at least $80.00 per square foot." Also, Bill Hall 
estimated build-out at $120,000.00 to $150,000.00 (Appellee's 
brief 6). 
Record: "Q: DO YOU RECALL THAT—A DISCUSSION AS TO 
WHETHER OR NOT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE B-2 
OCCUPANCY, THAT THAT MAY BE MORE LIKE FIFTY DOLLARS A 
FOOT? 
"A: I COULD HAVE QUOTED THAT KIND OF NUMBER, YES. 
"A: I DO NOT RECALL THE SPECIFICS OF THAT CONVERSATION. 
I DO NOT KNOW—I KNOW SOME THINGS. I DON'T KNOW WHAT WAS 
DISCUSSED IN THAT MEETING SPECIFICALLY. (Nelson. R. 1077) 
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Record: "Q: DID THEY SAY ANYTHING ABOUT PRICE? 
"A: I AM TRYING TO REMEMBER. I REALLY CAN'T RECALL 
EXACTLY BUT LIKE I SAID, MY IMPRESSION IF THEY DID SAY 
SOMETHING IT WAS LIKE, OHf THIS SEEMS A LITTLE HIGH OR 
SOMETHING LIKE THAT. (Hall R 1029) 
6. Appellee: "As of [September 23, 1988,] CPSS still had not 
decided what type of occupancy it wanted, JNC said CPSS wanted the 
same type of certification it had in its current facility." 
(Appellee's brief 6-7) (Finding 16). 
Record: "A: IN THOSE DISCUSSIONS [WITH TEERLINK] WE 
MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE REASON WE WERE MOVING OR WANTED TO 
MOVE AND BUILD A NEW SPACE WITH A NEW SURGICAL CENTER WAS 
SO WE COULD HAVE A CERTIFIED SURGICAL CENTER THAT WOULD 
BE STATE AND FEDERALLY CERTIFIED TO DO MEDICARE AND 
MEDICAID PATIENTS. AT THAT POINT IN TIME WE DIDN'T KNOW 
THE WORDS TO USE, THE I AND B AND ALL THOSE OTHER WORDS 
TO USE. WE MADE IT VERY CLEAR. 
AND WHEN WE GOT THE FIRST DOCUMENT BACK FROM MR. 
HALL THAT HAD ON THE FACE OF THE DOCUMENT THE FACT THAT 
A CERTIFIED SURGICAL CENTER OR LICENSED SURGICAL CENTER 
WAS TO BE PART OF THE NEW BUILDOUT. (JNC, R 2030). 
7. Appellee: "The signatures of the individual doctors [on the 
proposed lease] contain no conditions whatsoever (except for the 
length of the term of the guarantee, which is not at issue in this 
lawsuit)." (Appellee's brief 7) (Finding 20). 
Record: EACH OF THE APPELLANTS TESTIFIED THAT THE 
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO FORMATION OF A LEASE WERE: 
CORPORATION WAS TO BECOME THE LESSEE UPON ITS DUE 
DILIGENCE; MEDICARE/MEDICAID CERTIFICATION WAS REQUIRED; 
EXPEDITIOUS COMPLETION OF THE CONSTRUCTION WAS ESSENTIAL; 
COSTS AT $44.00 PER SQUARE FOOT AS REPRESENTED BY 
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TEERLINK MUST BE MET, AND THEY SIGNED AS GUARANTORS. (R 
1957, 1958, 1959, 2068, 1256, 1683). 
8. Appellee: "Each of the parties intended that CPSS be the 
lessee. . . . CUA believed that CPSS was the lessee" (Appellee's 
brief 8) (Finding 26). 
Record: TRUE, AND THE INTENDED LESSEE NEVER SIGNED! 
9. Appellee: "CPSS had purchased a binder containing all of the 
certification requirements." (Appellee's brief 9) 
Record: TSL—REGARDING "BINDER OF CERTIFICATE"—"I HAD 
THUMBED THROUGH IT." (R 1760). "I TOLD HIM BEGINNING 
AUGUST 12, WHEN I FIRST MET WITH [TEERLINK] 1988, THAT 
THERE WERE REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTIFICATION AND THAT WE 
WANTED A CERTIFIED FACILITY AND THEY INVOLVED MANY THINGS 
AND WE NEEDED TO BE SURE THAT ALL THOSE WERE MET AND 
COMPLIED WITH SO WE COULD GET CERTIFICATION." (R 1761-
1762) "I DIDN'T EVEN KNOW THEM ALL." (R 1762) 
"Q: DID YOU EVER USE THIS BIG BINDER, THAT DR. CLAYTON 
NOW HAS IN HIS HANDS, IN APPLYING FOR CERTIFICATION OR 
ASSISTING IN APPLYING FOR CERTIFICATION FOR THIS 
PARTICULAR SPACE? 
"A: WE WERE NOT AT THAT POINT, SO I DID NOT." 
(R 1763) 
10. Appellee: "CPSS never prepared the required narrative, 
although both CPSS' architects and the State Health Department 
requested CPSS to prepare the narrative on several occasions." 
(Appellee's brief 9) (Finding 52). 
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Record—JNC: "A: BECAUSE I KNEW — I HAD TALKED WITH 
THE STATE, KNEW THEY WANTED A $lf500 FEE TO ACCOMPANY 
THOSE DOCUMENTS WHEN THEY WERE READY TO COME. I DIDN'T 
WANT TO SEND A $1,500 FEE UNTIL I KNEW THAT THE FLOOR 
PLANS WE WERE HAVING DRAWN WOULD BE SATISFACTORY. . . . 
IN DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER PEOPLE THAT I HAD HAD THAT HAD 
DONE THIS PROCESS, I HAD TALKED WITH DR. LINDLEY ABOUT 
IT. MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE NARRATIVE WAS A SHORT 
DOCUMENT, ONE TO THREE PAGES LONG, AND THAT IT WOULD NOT 
TAKE VERY LONG TO PRODUCE." (R 2037) 
11. Appellee: "CPSS' architects testified that it is not unusual 
to place an I-occupancy facility in an existing building . . . ." 
(Appellee's brief 9) 
Record: "Q: THOSE COSTS WERE SOMEWHAT UNIQUE 
TO THE PLACE THAT THEY WERE TRYING TO BE 
PLACED INTO, IS THAT FAIR TO SAY? 
"A: YES (APPELLANT'S ARCHITECT DEBRY R-119). 
Record—EXPERT WITNESS GREEN: "A: IT'S VERY CLEAR IN 
TABLE 5-C THAT AN 1-1 OCCUPANCY, WHICH IS A HOSPITAL OR 
SURGICAL SUITE-TYPE OCCUPANCY, UNDER '3N BUILDING' IT 
JUST SAYS 'NOT PERMITTED.' IT IS ONE OF VERY FEW THAT 
ARE IN THE TABLE BUT IT IS NOT PERMITTED." (R 2080) 
12. Appellee: "Valley Bank issued a loan commitment to CPSS in 
the amount of $300,000 for the purpose of financing leasehold 
improvements in the CUA building." (Appellee's brief 11) (Finding 
44). 
Record—SOMMER (BANK OFFICER): "Q: AND ISN'T IT ALSO 
TRUE THAT YOU WOULD BELIEVE IT WOULD BE A PERMITTED USE, 
LET'S SAY, OF WHATEVER MONEY THEY DREW DOWN FROM THAT 
LOAN TO BUY, LET'S SAY, MEDICAL EQUIPMENT? 
"A: THAT IS ALSO CORRECT." (R 1209) 
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Record—JLC: "Q: SO THE LOAN APPLICATION INCLUDED NOT 
ONLY IMPROVEMENTS THAT HAD TO BE MADE AND PAID FOR BUT, 
LIKEWISE, THE EQUIPMENT YOU MAY NEED? 
"A: THAT IS TRUE." (R 1970) 
13. Appellee: "Mr. Teerlink did not act as the agent of CUA, but 
acted as agent for TSL and CPSS." (Appellee's brief 13) 
Record—Teerlink: "Q: YOU TOLD THEM YOU WERE AN OWNER 
OF COMMERCIAL UNION? 
"A: THEY KNEW THAT I [TEERLINK] WAS AN OWNER, YES." (R 
1340) 
Record—EXHIBIT 106—LETTER SENT TO 400 DOCTORS 
INDICATING LEE TEERLINK AND BLAINE SAVAGE WERE OWNERS OF 
CUA (R 1578) 
Record—BEARNSON—"A: MR. TEERLINK DIDN'T MENTION 
ANYTHING TO ME OTHER THAN HE ALWAYS TALKED IN THE FIRST 
PERSON. HE SAID, 'OUR BUILDING. THIS IS OUR LENDER. 
THIS IS OUR APPROVED LEASE WITH OUR LENDER. ' AND DURING 
THAT PERIOD OF TIME IT WAS ALSO MY UNDERSTANDING THAT HE 
WAS THE PRINCIPAL." (R 1706) 
Record—TSL—"[TEERLINK] SAID HE WAS — HE HAD AN 
OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN THAT BUILDING . . . ." (R 1663) 
Record—TSL—"[TEERLINK] SAID HE OWNED THIRTY-FIVE 
PERCENT OF THAT BUILDING. MR. TEERLINK INDICATED HIS 
OWNERSHIP WAS SECOND TO MR. SAVAGE." (R 1678) 
Record—SAVAGE—"HE [TEERLINK] IS MY AGENT, YES." (R 
1530) 
Record—SAVAGE—"Q: YOU ADMITTED THAT HE, MR. LEE 
TEERLINK, WAS YOUR REPRESENTATIVE TO SPEAK FOR YOU, OR IN 
OTHER WORDS, HE WAS YOUR MOUTHPIECE, WASN'T HE? 
"A: HE WAS, YES, BECAUSE I DID NEVER MEET WITH THE 
CLAYTONS. 
"Q: AND AS YOUR MOUTHPIECE, YOU KNEW THAT THE CLAYTONS 
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WOULD RELY ON ANY REPRESENTATIONS HE MADE TO THEM ABOUT 
COMMERCIAL UNION OR ABOUT THIS SPACE—WOULD BE RELIED 
UPON BY THE DOCTORS; IS THAT CORRECT? 
"A: YES." (R 1531) 
14. Appellee: "TSL acknowledged to Lee Teerlink and Blaine Savage 
his obligation under the lease agreement." (Appellee's brief 12) 
(Finding 50). 
Record—SAVAGE—"Q: WHEN YOU SAY HE INDICATED HE FELT A 
MORAL OBLIGATION, YOU DIDN'T PROBE HIM ON WHAT THAT MORAL 
OBLIGATION MEANT, THE MORAL OBLIGATION TO PAY A MONTH-TO-
MONTH TENANCY OR ANY OTHER KIND OF OBLIGATION? 
"A: I DIDN'T GO ANY FURTHER ON THAT." (R 1574) 
Appellee's putative "facts" are clearly erroneous when 
compared to the record. The record is replete with more. These 
facts significantly impact the outcome in the present case when 
applying them to the case. The facts as presented in the record 
take precedence. Therefore, the facts in the record should control 
the outcome of the case rather than the facts as perceived by the 
Appellee. The problem in this case has been a lack of factual and 
legal clarity presented to the Court over an eleven month period 
causing the Court to misapply said erroneous facts to the law. Had 
the Judge had a Pre-Trial Order, Trial Brief or Opening Statement 
the Court would have ruled according to law. When reviewing these 
facts and others as stated in the Appellant's Brief, it becomes 
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evident that there is at best a month-to-month tenancy here with no 
meeting of the minds. 
II. THE DOCTRINE OF PART PERFORMANCE 
The Appellee directs a series of its erroneous and perceived 
facts (unsubstantiated by the Record at pages 20 and 21 of 
Appellee's Brief) to convince the Court that there was partial 
performance by plaintiff to take the case out of the statute of 
frauds and thereby bypass the unsigned lease problem. If a 
plaintiff seeks to enforce a parol contract via the doctrine of 
part performance, that plaintiff must first establish the existence 
of the contract by competent evidence. Adams v. Manning 46 U.S. 82 
(1915). Furthermore, that evidence must be presented in the form 
of clear and definite testimony. Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74 
(Utah 1982). Appellee has failed to show through clear and 
definite testimony that an oral contract existed because the 
testimony presented at trial indicates thatf among other things, 
there was no meeting of the minds on all material terms and that 
certain conditions were unfulfilled. Appellees themselves cannot 
decide who the lessee is, to wit: a partnership, a corporation or 
three individuals signing on the guarantor line. Appellees 
themselves cannot agree that Section 6 relating to warranties was 
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to be lessee or lessor warrants. Notwithstanding the lease clearly 
stating lessor warrants Blaine Savage says it was supposed to say 
lessee warrants (R 1526). Appellees first say you do not read the 
two leases together since the first one was rejected - (Court at R 
1131-32 and Johnson at R 1131-32). 
Appellees then state in Conclusion of Law #12 that the leases 
are to be read together. 
Record—THE COURT: "Q: I AM ANXIOUSLY A WAITING TO HEAR MR. 
JOHNSON'S ARGUMENT ABOUT THAT. OBVIOUSLY, IT'S HIS — HIS 
THEORY IS THAT THE TWO DOCUMENTS MAKE ONE LEASE. IS THAT WHAT 
YOUR THEORY IS? 
"A: NO, THAT IS NOT OUR THEORY AT ALL. 
MQ: HE HAS THREE THEORIES ONE ~ 
"COURT: WHERE IS THE LEASE DOCUMENT? DR. JOHN L DID NOT SIGN 
THE ONE? 
"A: (MR. JOHNSON) THAT WAS REJECTED BY COMMERCIAL UNION 
BECAUSE IT DIDN'T HAVE PERSONAL GUARANTORS THAT WAS JUST — WE 
ONLY INTRODUCED THAT INTO EVIDENCE TO SHOW THE CHRONOLOGY. 
"COURT: THIS OTHER ONE IS SIGNED BY THE GUARANTORS AND NOT BY 
THE PRINCIPALS? 
"A: (MR. JOHNSON) THAT IS CORRECT. WE HAVE SEVERAL 
ARGUMENTS. RATIFICATION: THE CORPORATION RATIFIED BY DOING 
ALL THE THINGS WE HAVE DISCUSSED OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS. 
THERE'S CASE LAW TO SUPPORT THAT. THERE'S ESTOPPEL, WE ALSO 
HAVE SOME CASE LAW THAT SAYS WHERE— 
"COURT: YOU DON'T CLAIM ANYTHING FOR WHICH ONE, EXHIBIT 
4 — 
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Notwithstanding the plaintiff's difficulty to determine the lease 
formation above and an oral lease contract that they mingle with 
the unsigned written lease document, the Appellee still asks this 
Court to enforce the unsigned lease agreement as the oral contract 
by using the equitable doctrine of part performance while trying to 
collect money damages and attorney fees. 
This Court must use prudence in applying the doctrine of part 
performance. The doctrine of part performance must be applied with 
great care, paying particular attention to the policy underlying 
the statute of frauds. The doctrine of part performance is not 
intended to nullify the statute of frauds, but merely to preclude 
its use as a means for perpetrating a fraud. Ravarino v. Price, 
260 P.2d 570 (Utah 1953). In this case, the statute of frauds 
would not be used to perpetrate a fraud; instead, the statute of 
frauds would invalidate the proposed lease, commissions to Mr. 
Savage of $15,000.00 and attorney fees never agreed upon. The 
parties would then be left as they were found, i.e. without a final 
long term agreement and into a month-to-month tenancy with the 
Appellants responsible to rebuild the demolished space less 
Appellants' proven set offs. 
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Additionally, Appellee's cannot make use of the doctrine of 
part performance to bring the proposed lease into existence. Full 
or substantial performance of the promise of one party is 
ordinarily a condition precedent to the right to maintain an action 
on the promise of the other unless the promise of the latter is 
independent of any performance by the former. Dermott v. Jones, 23 
U.S. 220(). Appellee did not substantially perform in fulfilling 
all conditions. The only performance in this case was moving ahead 
performance on the part of Appellants to see if the conditions 
could be met before signing a long-term lease. Therefore, Appellee 
clearly cannot coerce Appellants to perform via the equitable 
doctrine of part performance when asking for money damages and when 
unintended by Appellants, nor when there is no evidence of fraud on 
Appellee. 
Ill REVIEW AND DISTINCTION OF CASES CITED BY APPELLEE 
The Appellee cites for their authority Ercanbrack vs. 
Crandall, Walker Motor Co., 550 P.2d 723 as authority for the 
position that a written contract, notwithstanding being signed, 
could still be deemed enforceable or accepted. 
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Upon careful review of that case, it really stands for the 
position maintained by Appellants in this case since the Court 
dismissed the plaintiff's complaint filed against the seller for 
specific performance due to the fact that defendant company had not 
counter-signed the sales contract as specifically required on the 
face of the contract itself. As a matter of fact, quite consistent 
with the law that Appellants are asserting, that Court cited as 
authority the case of Murphy vs. Salt Lake City, 236 P. 680, in 
support of the Court's decision to not allow the plaintiff to 
enforce an unsigned contract and the Court recited the holding of 
the Murphy case as follows: 
". . it would defeat the very purpose of formal 
contracts to permit a party to evoke the use of words or 
conduct inconsistent with its terms to prove that the 
parties did not mean what they said, or to use such 
inconsistent words or conduct to demonstrate uncertainty 
or ambiguity where none would otherwise exist. Generally 
speaking, neither of the parties nor the Court has any 
right to ignore or modify conditions that are clearly 
expressed merely because it may subject one of the 
parties to hardship, but they must be enforced in 
accordance with the intention as . . . manifested by the 
language used by the parties to the contract." 
Clearly the lease contract at issue here has signature lines for a 
lessee. The unequivocal testimony of all of the Defendants was 
that a lessee was to sign and it was their intention for a lessee 
to be bound thereby as the primary obligor on the lease. Further, 
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there are other conditions to be met before the lease became a 
long-term lease. Notwithstanding the hardship that may be imposed 
upon Appellee the Appellee should have insured that the lease 
contract was signed in all appropriate spaces and completely agreed 
upon with all conditions being removed to allow this Appellee to 
invoke the use of words or conduct inconsistent with its very terms 
to prove what the parties did not mean. The unequivocal fact is 
that the document required signatures and the parties signed as 
stated on the contract only as guarantors. To change the clear 
meaning of the contract violates the very holding cited by Appellee 
in Ercanbrack. Ercanbrack is strong law considering the strong 
decent of Justice Crockett wherein Justice Crockett indicated an 
unfairness in keeping the Plaintiff committed without the Defendant 
having to be bound. In this case the Defendants were committed and 
bound to a month-to-month tenancy but not to the long-term 
agreement until its signing, which signing never occurred. 
The other case cited by Appellants is Barker vs. Francis, 741 
P.2d 548. The Appellee cites that case for the authority that 
specific performance is available in a lease case. To the 
contrary, the case dealt with an Earnest Money Agreement on the 
sale/exchange of land. The Court found the Earnest Money Agreement 
enforceable but denied specific performance since the party 
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requesting specific performance was attempting to do the same thing 
as the Plaintiff is requesting of this Court, to wit: rewrite the 
contract. In the Barker case, the Plaintiff was asking the Court 
to enforce the Earnest Money Agreement and make it say a cash sale 
instead of an exchange was the best remedy. In this case the 
Plaintiff is asking the Court to rewrite the guarantor language and 
make them become lcassees and further is asking the Court to fill in 
the lessee block and enforce a five-year lease notwithstanding all 
conditions not being met. The Court in Barker laid down sound 
principals of law that relate to this case when stating "while the 
court may interpret contracts which are open to interpretation, a 
court may not make a new one for the parties and may not alter or 
amend one which the parties themselves made." Citing Provo City 
Corp vs. Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979). The Court 
further indicated that only under the proper circumstances is 
specific performance available to vendors of land. Hence, the case 
does not represent the position asserted in the Brief by the 
Plaintiff/Appellee. Accordingly, since this is a claim for money 
damages and not equity, specific performance or the part 
performance equity doctrine is not available to save the Appellees 
at the expense of the Appellants. Appellee says it asks for 
specific performance and yet the judgment itself is for money in 
the amount of $293,077.06. 
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SUMMARY 
Relating to the remaining arguments stated in the Brief of 
Appelleef the Appellants draw the Court's attention to its original 
Brief and state that each of the other arguments contained in the 
Appellee's Brief are either distinguishable or are not applicable. 
With respect to the third argument relating to ratification, 
Appellee cites Ercanbrack vs. Crandall Walker Motor Co.. As stated 
above, the dicta cited by Appellee was not followed and in that 
case it was held that a signed agreement was necessary. There are 
no facts or evidence that show ratification whatsoever. 
With respect to argument 4, the Appellee argues that there 
were no unfulfilled conditions and no mention of I-certification 
(erroneously referred to as I-occupancy) by Appellee. Clearly the 
facts are contrary to Appellants argument above. The Appellee 
continues to argue that the intention of the Appellants was to sign 
a long-term lease and be bound thereto regardless of the price of 
the improvements, the time in which it takes to obtain I-
certification or any of the other conditions the Appellants have 
expressed. The Appellee would have this Court uphold this 
proposed long-term lease agreement even if it cost 10 million 
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dollars to develop the improvements and obtain the I-certification 
bargained for. Then Appellee claims the part performance of the 
Appellants takes the case out of the statute of frauds and yet they 
continue to try to hold to the words on the unsigned lease. They 
argue the typed in lease term has priority over the other portions 
of the lease, that was never agreed to. 
With respect to the remaining arguments the facts shown in the 
record clearly reflect no written lease existed. Accordingly, with 
no lease in place the Appellee had a month-to-month lease that was 
paid monthly until terminated by Appellants. The attorney fees 
requested, the overcharged build-out costs and $15,000.00 in non-
agreed upon commissions to Mr. Savage (now a part of the judgment 
against Appellants) should be reversed and remanded for 
determination of the proper rebuild amount on the demolished 
portion of the leasehold premises and a determination of 
Appellants' damages. 
Thank you for your review of an extremely important case for 
the Appellants and for future tenants who should be protected 
against ambiguities and lack of mutual assent. Leases should be 
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carefully drafted and understood. This is the burden and 
responsibility of the Lessor who is in that business. 
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